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Abstract
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can
learn her payo￿ type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially
optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each
agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition.
In the context of the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we establish
that the equilibrium level exceeds the socially optimal level of information with pos-
itive interdependence. The individual decisions to acquire information are strategic
substitutes. The di￿erence between the equilibrium and the e￿cient level of infor-
mation acquisition is increasing in the interdependence of the bidders’ valuations and
decreasing in the number of informed bidders.
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In the vast literature on auctions, surprisingly few papers have focussed explicitly on costly
information acquisition. This is somewhat puzzling given the close connections between auc-
tions and price formation processes in competitive markets. Milgrom (1981) uses a multi-unit
Vickrey auction model to illustrate the possible coexistence of costly information and e￿-
cient information aggregation. The connections to the rational expectations equilibrium have
been since worked on extensively but the issue of information acquisition has received sub-
stantially less attention. In our view, the questions relating to socially optimal information
acquisition remain open for a large class of auction models.
Consider, for example, the situation in which a number of established companies bid for
the takeover of a target company. At the outset, all bidders are symmetrically informed
but before submitting a bid, each bidder may hire a consulting ￿rm to assess the value of
the target company. The value of the target company may depend on the extent to which
the asset (or activity) of the target ￿rm matches that of the acquiring ￿rms. In addition,
if the bidders are competing with each other in the (product) market, then the quality of
the match between target ￿rm and ￿rm i also matters for ￿rm j. In this paper, we analyze
the bidders’ private incentives to acquire information in such interdependent value models
and establish a comparison between the equilibrium level and the socially optimal level of
information acquisition.
If the auction designer has a utilitarian welfare objective and valuations are private,
it is transparent to see that the agents have the correct incentives to acquire information
in a socially optimal manner. In the Vickrey auction, individual payo￿s, when viewed as
functions of own type only, coincide with the sum of payo￿s to all players (up to the addition
of a constant). As a result, the private incentives coincide with those of the planner, as
established by Stegeman (1996).
However, if the valuations are interdependent, the private incentives to acquire informa-
tion di￿er systematically from those of the social planner. Maskin (1992) and Bergemann and
V￿ alim￿ aki (2002), among others, have shown that given the decisions by the other bidders,
an individual bidder has too strong incentives to acquire information if the valuations are
positively dependent. Since these earlier contributions considered only individual decisions,
2they could not compare the decentralized equilibrium level of information acquisition with
the socially optimal level. In this paper, we analyze equilibrium information acquisition in
a model with binary information decisions where the bidders’ true payo￿ types are initially
unknown and each bidder may observe a costly private signal revealing her true payo￿ type.
In a linear model with positive dependence, we show that:
(i) the private value of information exceeds the social value of information everywhere,
(ii) the private value of being informed is decreasing in the number of informed bidders.
Property (i) con￿rms the results in Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002), and property (ii)
means that bidders’ information decisions are strategic substitutes. Property (ii) insures
that the pure strategy equilibrium in the game of information acquisition is unique and that
the local comparison can be extended to the equilibrium comparison. That is, with positive
dependence, more bidders become informed in the equilibria of the information acquisition
game than in the social planner’s solution.
Our basic model is a single-unit auction where bidders acquire information about their
true valuations simultaneously prior to the auction stage. We assume that information
acquisition is covert, and as a result, the allocation mechanism cannot be conditional on
information acquisition decisions. In the main section of the paper, we assume that the
bidders’ valuations are linear in their own signals as well as their opponents’ signals. A
generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is used to allocate the object. Given
the independence of the bidders’ types, the extension of the revenue equivalence theorem in
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) implies that the same expected payo￿s result in any auction
with an e￿cient allocation rule. In our symmetric linear single-unit auction model, these
payo￿s coincide with the payo￿s of the more familiar ascending price auction.1
In our model, the bidders’ types are assumed to be independent across individual bidders.
The main reason for this assumption is a theoretical one. With independence, the socially
optimal allocation mechanism is quite simple and, furthermore, it is detail-free in the sense
of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), i.e. it does not depend on the distributions of individual
valuations. In models with correlated types (including a￿liated values), insights from the
previous literature following Cremer and McLean (1985) and Cremer and McLean (1988)
suggest that it is possible to construct mechanisms that align individual incentives to acquire
1Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) shows more generally how to construct e￿cient detail-free indirect mech-
anisms where the bidders submit contingent bids.
3information with the societal ones (see Obara (2007)). Such mechanisms, however, depend
on the ￿ne details of the statistical dependence between types. If we restrict attention to
a speci￿c auction format such as the ascending price auction that has an equilibrium in
ex post incentive compatible strategies, our results can be extended to cover models with
correlated types as well. With correlated types, however, revenue equivalence does not
hold and di￿erent e￿cient mechanisms yield di￿erent expected payo￿s to the bidders and
therefore also di￿erent incentives to acquire information at the ex ante stage.
The third main modeling assumption in our model is that information acquisition is a
binary choice. The cost of becoming informed can be interpreted as the cost of inspecting
the item for sale. Without inspection, bidding would be based on prior information only.
While it is clear that in some applications the amount of information (or the rigor of the
inspection) can be varied, it is less clear how this should be modeled. The general model
used in Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002) assumes that signals of di￿erent informativeness
can be purchased at the ex ante stage at a cost that is increasing in the informativeness. At
this level of generality, it appears di￿cult to compare the individual and social incentives
in a de￿nitive manner. The main source of the di￿culty is to establish a link between an
abstract and statistical notion of informativeness and the game theoretic property of strategic
substitutes. On the other hand, if we were to consider a particular parametric model (such
as the normal learning model), then we expect that the current results continue to hold
qualitatively.
We consider pure strategy equilibrium as well as mixed strategy equilibria of this game
of information acquisition. For both types of equilibria, information decisions of bidders
are strategic substitutes and the equilibria feature socially excessive information acquisition.
Moreover, the di￿erence between equilibrium level of information and e￿cient level of in-
formation diminishes as the strength of positive dependence weakens or as the number of
informed bidders increases.
Since information acquisition is assumed to be a binary decision, the pure strategy equi-
librium may be asymmetric: in equilibrium some bidders acquire information while others
do not. In this case, we show that more bidders become informed in equilibrium than in
a planner’s solution. For the mixed strategy equilibrium, we focus on the symmetric one.
The relevant comparison in the information acquisition game is the problem where the plan-
ner chooses the same probability of becoming informed for all bidders. By this choice we
4can concentrate solely on the informational externalities in the problem rather than the co-
ordination problems arising due to mixing. Again, our results show that the equilibrium
probability of information acquisition exceeds the socially optimal probability. In the work-
ing paper version, Bergemann, Shi, and Valimaki (2007), we show that the basic insights of
the single-unit auction carry over to a model where multiple objects are sold but bidders
have unit demands.
Furthermore, we extend our positive results to a nonlinear model which nests the additive
and multiplicative speci￿cations as special cases. We con￿rm both property (i) and (ii).
However, it is di￿cult to obtain similar results in a general nonlinear setting. The main
reason is the following. In nonlinear models, the ranking of two agents’ valuations, depends
in general on the signal realization of a third agent. Thus, the third agent’s decision to acquire
information produces socially valuable information for the allocation decision between the
￿rst two agents. This is possible even in situations where the third agent does not receive
the object and the private value of her information is zero. Consequently, this may lead to
the reversal of ranking between private value of information and social value of information.
That is, property (i) may be violated.
In the paper, we also present an example to show why property (ii) is important for our
positive results. In the example, bidders’ valuations are positively dependent and individual
incentives to gather information are higher than social incentives. But information decisions
are strategic complements, and thus violate property (ii). We show that the equilibrium level
of information may be insu￿cient compared to the social optimal one. We ￿nally discuss
how our analysis of the auction environment with positive interdependence can be extended
to the case with negative interdependence.
1.2 Related Literature
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) propose a standard rational expectations model to address
a fundamental issue in economics: How does the market adjust to new information. In
their model, ex ante identical and uninformed market traders can acquire information at a
cost and use it to make a pro￿t by trading a risky asset. The ￿uctuation of prices makes
private information (partially) revealed to uninformed traders. They conjecture that if in-
formation is costly, then equilibrium market prices cannot fully reveal private information.
Furthermore they argue that costless information is not only su￿cient, but also necessary for
5e￿cient market. Another important conclusion in the paper is that information acquisition
decisions are strategic substitutes: the more individuals are informed, the less valuable is
the information.2 Since Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) analyze a model with pure common
values, the question of socially e￿cient information acquisition does not arise.
While a large number of papers analyze information aggregation in large markets given
endowed or acquired information (among them Milgrom (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(1997) and Jackson (2003)), other equally important questions are largely unaddressed. Does
equilibrium information acquisition coincide with the socially optimal level? What types of
models generate excessive information in equilibrium and what types of models lead to
insu￿cient investment in information? These are the focus of the current paper. In the
papers on information aggregation, either the object has pure common value or the common
component of the object is the same for everyone, and hence the socially optimal level
of information is always zero for allocation purposes. Thus, these speci￿cations are not
suitable for our analysis. The speci￿cations contained in the current paper introduce a more
general positive dependence into the model, and thus allow us to compare equilibrium level
of information to the social e￿cient level of information.
A recent strand of literature has studied the incentives for information acquisition in spe-
ci￿c auction formats. Stegeman (1996) shows that ￿rst and second price independent private
value auctions result in the same and importantly e￿cient incentives for information acqui-
sition. Matthews (1984) analyzes information acquisition in a ￿rst-price auction with pure
common values and investigates how the seller’s revenue varies with respect to the amount
of acquired information and whether the equilibrium price fully reveals bidders’ information.
Finally, Persico (2000) shows that the incentive to acquire information is stronger in the
￿rst-price auction than in the second-price auction if bidders’ valuations are a￿liated. Since
the latter two papers are not directly concerned with e￿cient allocation mechanisms, they
say little about the overall level of information acquisition either from the social welfare or
the equilibrium point of view.
Some of the issues that we are interested in also arise in the context of costly entry into
auctions. In these models, it is typically assumed that a bidder learns her true valuation
for the object for sale upon paying an entry fee to the auction. In French and McCormick
2In a recent paper, Chamley (2007) proposes a model of ￿nancial markets in which the decision to acquire
information are strategic complements rather than substitutes.
6(1984) and Levin and Smith (1994), an auction with pure private or pure common values
is analyzed. With an exogenously ￿xed entry cost, entry is shown to be e￿cient for private
values and excessive for pure common values. In Levin and Smith (1994) the focus is on the
determination of the optimal entry fee so as to maximize revenue. In our model, valuations
are interdependent and the information acquisition is in general not at the socially optimal
level. This raises the possibility that a social planner could increase the welfare by setting a
positive entry fee in our setting as we discuss in the conclusion.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the
pure strategy analysis of the single unit auction with a linear payo￿ structure. Section 4
derives the mixed strategy equilibrium in this environment. Section 5 extends the analysis to
nonlinear payo￿ environments. Section 6 discusses the role of the strategic substitute prop-
erty and illustrates how the analysis can be adapted to the case of negative interdependence.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. The proofs of all results are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
We consider an auction setting with a single object for sale and I bidders. The true value
of the object to bidder i is given by




The parameter ￿ is a measure of interdependence.3 With ￿ > 0 the interdependence is
positive, and with ￿ < 0 the model displays negative interdependence. If ￿ = 0; then the
model is one of private values and if ￿ = 1; then the model is of pure common values. We
shall initially concentrate on the case of positive interdependence and discuss in Section 6
how the analysis can be extended to the case of negative interdependence. Each agent i has
a quasilinear utility:
ui (￿) ￿ ti
where ti 2 R is a monetary transfer.
3In an earlier version of the paper we considered a normalized speci￿cation given by: ui (￿i;￿￿i)=(1 ￿
￿)￿i + ￿(1=(I ￿ 1))
P
j6=i ￿j and the results are qualitiatively similar. With this speci￿cation, the range of
possible valuations for bidder i is independent of the number of bidders, but now the single-crossing condition
depends on the number of bidders.
7Initially, each bidder i only knows that the payo￿ relevant types f￿jg
I
j=1 are independently




￿ R+: The distribution F has an
associated density f and a mean valuation:
￿ , E[￿i]:
Each bidder i can acquire information about her payo￿ relevant type ￿i at a positive cost
c > 0. The decision to acquire information is a binary decision. If bidder i acquires informa-
tion, then she observes the realization of ￿i; otherwise her information is given by the prior
distribution F.
We consider the possibility of informational e￿ciency in an e￿cient allocation mechanism,
namely the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (see Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000)). A necessary and su￿cient condition for the implementability of the
e￿cient allocation is that ui (￿i;￿￿i) satis￿es the single crossing property. In the current
linear setting, the single crossing condition is equivalent to ￿ ￿ 1.









1 if ￿i > yi;
0 if ￿i < yi;
(2)
which speci￿es the probability of winning conditional on the reported type pro￿le ￿. In case
of a tie among the highest types, the winner is chosen among the tied bidders with equal





ui (yi;￿￿i) if ￿i ￿ yi;
0 if ￿i < yi;
(3)
speci￿es the payment of bidder i. The winning bidder makes a payment which is equal to
her value of the object conditional on tying the payo￿ type of the second highest bidder.
Consequently, the equilibrium payo￿ for a bidder i at type pro￿le ￿i is




￿i ￿ yi if ￿i ￿ yi;
0 if ￿i < yi:
8In the generalized VCG mechanism, the payment of agent i is independent of the report
of agent i conditional on the allocation and the equilibrium is an ex post Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)).
With the linear speci￿cation of payo￿ types given by (1), the expected value of an un-
informed bidder is the same as that of an informed bidder with a true payo￿ type ￿i = ￿:
The direct revelation mechanism therefore does not have to account for informed and unin-
formed bidders separately. In section 5 we shall look at environments in which the valuation
function is not linear in the types ￿i and then an uninformed agent will have to report her
entire distributional information rather than the mean ￿ only.
3 Pure Strategy Equilibrium
We ￿rst establish the socially optimal information policy. Subsequently, we analyze the
equilibrium information policies of the agents in the generalized VCG mechanism. Initially
we focus our attention on the pure strategy equilibria and consider the mixed strategy
equilibrium in the next section.
3.1 Socially E￿cient Policy
The bidders are ex ante identical. The socially optimal policy has to weigh the bene￿ts of
increasing information against the cost of additional information. The social value of addi-
tional information arises from the possibility of identifying an agent with a higher valuation.
As the number of informed agents increases, it becomes increasingly unlikely that an ad-
ditionally informed agent will have a valuation exceeding the highest valuation among the
currently informed agents. The optimal number of informed agents will therefore depend on
the prior distribution and the cost of information acquisition. We denote the set of informed
agents by f1;:::;mg and the remaining set of uninformed agents by fm+1;:::;Ig. The agent
m is the marginally informed agent. We denote by ￿h the highest payo￿ type among the
(m ￿ 1) informed bidders, and denote the informed bidder with payo￿ type ￿h as bidder h.
It is straightforward to characterize the expected social gain of the m-th informed agent.
The information of the m-th agent improves the social e￿ciency if and only if the information
is pivotal for the allocation decision. By the single crossing condition, the information of
agent m is pivotal if and only if it leads the planner to allocate the object to agent m. If
9the payo￿ type of agent m exceeds the types of all other agents, then it has to be larger
than the payo￿ types of all informed agents f1;:::;m ￿ 1g as well as all uninformed agents
fm + 1;:::;Ig. Without loss of generality, we may assume that if the object is optimally
assigned to an uninformed agent, then it is assigned to agent I.
The expected social gain of informing agent m, denoted by ￿￿
m, is then given by:
￿
￿
m = E￿ [(um (￿) ￿ uh (￿)) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + (um (￿) ￿ uI (￿)) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ￿ > ￿h)], (4)





1 if event A is true,
0 if event A is false.
If bidder m becomes informed, then she may either win against bidder h or bidder I, re-
spectively. The size of the expected gain from the improved allocation is the corresponding
di￿erence in the valuations between bidder m and the current winner. We can use the linear
structure of the valuation ui (￿) to rewrite (4) as:
E￿ [((￿m ￿ ￿h) + ￿(￿h ￿ ￿m)) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + ((￿m ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿m)) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ￿ > ￿h)].
With the linear payo￿ structure, the expected gain from information depends only on ￿m and
the highest payo￿ type among the remaining agents, ￿h or ￿: We denote by ym the highest
payo￿ type among all agents exclusive of m:
ym = max
j6=m
￿j = maxf￿h;￿g: (5)
We can write ￿￿
m in a more compact form as:
￿
￿
m = (1 ￿ ￿)E￿m;ym [(￿m ￿ ym) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ym)]: (6)
The case of m = I is slightly di￿erent. If the last bidder I is informed, then indeed
all bidders are informed. The information of bidder I now becomes pivotal in two di￿erent
circumstances: (i) ￿h > ￿ and (ii) ￿h < ￿. In the ￿rst case, bidder I did not get the object
without additional information, but may now receive the object. In the second case, bidder
I did get the object without information, but may now fail to get the object if her true payo￿
10type turns out to be below ￿h.4 The expected social gain from information is then given by:
￿
￿
I = E￿ [(uI (￿) ￿ uh (￿)) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + (uh (￿) ￿ uI (￿)) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I)]. (7)
By using the linear structure of the model, we can rewrite (7) to obtain:
￿
￿
I = (1 ￿ ￿)E￿I;￿h [(￿I ￿ ￿h) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + (￿h ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I)]: (8)
We denote the socially optimal decision to acquire information for the m-th agent by
s￿
m 2 f0;1g. Then we can state the social e￿cient policy as follows.
Proposition 1 (Social E￿cient Policy)
1. The socially e￿cient policy s￿












m is strictly decreasing in m and ￿ for all m.
The social gain from an additional informed bidder is positive when the information is
pivotal with positive probability. When more bidders are informed, it is less likely that the
newly informed bidder has a payo￿ type higher than those of her opponents. Therefore,
the gross social gain from information acquisition is decreasing in the number of informed
bidders.
With positive dependence, the e￿ciency loss from misallocation is lower than in an envi-
ronment with private values. A larger ￿, which represents a higher positive interdependence,
leads to a smaller loss from the misallocation due to the imperfect information. In conse-
quence the social gain from information acquisition is smaller when bidders’ valuations are
more positively dependent.
4The di￿erence in the analysis of the marginal bidder m for m < I and m = I is only due to our initial
choice of selecting the last agent I to be the winning agent among all uninformed agents. Alternatively,
the social planner could have randomized the assignment among the uninformed agents (conditional on the
uninformed winning). In this case, the complicating e￿ect for agent I would have already appeared for all
agents before I.
113.2 Equilibrium Policy
We now consider the private incentives of the agent to acquire information in the generalized
VCG mechanism. We maintain the notation and identify bidder m as the marginal bidder to
acquire information. We denote the expected private gain of agent m to become informed by
b ￿m. As in the socially optimal program, we assume that if an uninformed agent is assigned
the object, then it is assigned to the last agent I. If there are multiple uninformed agents,
then the resulting monetary transfer will leave agent I indi￿erent between receiving and not
receiving the object. With this convention, it is again useful to treat the case of m < I
and m = I separately. The marginal bidder m gains from gathering information if and only
if she wins the object with the information. In the generalized VCG mechanism, the m-th
bidder’s net gain from information is:
b ￿m = E￿ [(um (￿m;￿￿m) ￿ um (ym;￿￿m)) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ym)];
where we de￿ned ym earlier in (5) as the highest payo￿ type among all bidders other than
m. We can use the linear payo￿ structure (1) to rewrite b ￿m:
b ￿m = E￿m;ym [(￿m ￿ ym) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ym)]. (9)
We compare the private gain with the social gain of information as described by (9) and
(6), respectively. If bidder m’s information is not pivotal, then both the private value and
the social value of information about the payo￿ type ￿m are equal to zero. On the other
hand, when bidder m’s signal is pivotal, then the private gain from information about ￿m
is given by (￿m ￿ ym); but the social gain from information is only (1 ￿ ￿)(￿m ￿ ym). The
di￿erence between the private and the social gains stems from the requirement of incentive
compatibility. If agent m is to report truthfully, then she can only be asked to pay a monetary
transfer equal to the lowest possible type at which the planner would be indi￿erent between
assigning and not assigning the object to bidder m. In particular for all payo￿ types above
her pivotal type, the monetary transfer has to stay constant, yet her private bene￿t increases
at the rate of 1. In contrast, in the social program, the marginal bene￿t from an increase
in the payo￿ type of agent m is given by (1 ￿ ￿)(￿m ￿ ym) as a higher payo￿ type of agent
m would already be bene￿cial at the rate ￿ even if agent m is not assigned the object.
Thus the social bene￿t of an increase in the payo￿ type of agent m is moderated by the
interdependence of the valuations.
12As we discussed in the context of the socially e￿cient policy, the description of the
bidder’s gain from information is somewhat di￿erent in the case of m = I. We have:
b ￿I = E￿ [(uI (￿I;￿￿I) ￿ uI (￿h;￿￿I)) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿)]
+ E￿ [(uI (￿h;￿￿I) ￿ uI (￿I;￿￿I)) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I)];
and using the linear payo￿ structure we get:
b ￿I = E￿I;￿h [(￿I ￿ ￿h) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + (￿h ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I)]: (10)
The ￿rst term represents bidder I’s gain by winning the object from the informed bidder h
when her payo￿ type is higher than the payo￿ type of the remaining agents. The second
term represents bidder I’s gain by avoiding to pay more for the object than it is worth to
her given that her true payo￿ type is lower than ￿h.5 By analogy, we refer to the equilibrium
decision of agent m to acquire information by b sm 2 f0;1g.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Policy)





0 if b ￿m < c;
1 if b ￿m ￿ c:
2. b ￿m is strictly decreasing in m and constant in ￿ for all m.
The private decisions of the agents to acquire information are again strategic substitutes:
bidder i is less willing to become informed as more of her opponents are informed. When
one more opponent gets informed, a bidder’s expected gain from information acquisition is
reduced in two ways. First, her chance of winning is lower. Second, conditional on winning,
her expected gain from winning is lower. Thus, if there are more informed opponents, a
bidder’s incentives to acquire information are lower. This property ensures that the game
of information acquisition has an essentially unique pure strategy equilibrium for any given
level of information cost.
5As before, we assume that the object is always assigned to bidder I if the uninformed bidders have the
highest value. This speci￿c tie-breaking rule is without loss of generality in the social problem and in the
equilibrium problem.If there are more than one uninformed agent, then the transfer price in the generalized
VCG mechanism is exactly equal the opportunity cost of giving the object to a uninformed agent, i.e. the
expected value of to an uninformed agent. Thus the net utility of an uninformed agent is zero for any
tie-breaking rule.
133.3 Welfare Comparison
We can now contrast the information decisions in the social and the equilibrium program by





m=1 and fb ￿mg
I
m=1:
We use the strategic substitute property to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Welfare Analysis)
For all m,
1. The marginal gains of information satisfy:
b ￿m > ￿
￿
m;
2. The equilibrium information acquisition is (weakly) socially excessive;
3. The di￿erence b ￿m ￿ ￿￿
m is strictly increasing in ￿;
4. The di￿erence b ￿m ￿ ￿￿
m is strictly decreasing in m:
With positive dependence, the equilibrium gain for a bidder to acquire information is
higher than the social gain. This result, together with the strategic substitute property,
implies that given any level of information cost, more bidders get informed in equilibrium
than desired in the social optimum. The discrepancy between equilibrium and social policy
decreases as more bidders are informed and as the positive interdependence weakens.
The statement about the comparison between the private value and the social value of
information, b ￿m > ￿￿
m, is weaker than what is actually established in the proof of the
proposition. The ￿rst part of the above proposition says that on average the social value
of information is lower than the private value of information. In fact, the social value of
information is lower than the private value of information at every possible pro￿le of payo￿
types. To see this, notice that when bidder m’s signal is not pivotal, both social value and
private value of information about ￿m is zero. On the other hand, when bidder m’s signal is
pivotal, then the private gain from information about ￿m is (￿m ￿ ym); but the social gain
from information is (1 ￿ ￿)(￿m ￿ ym); which is smaller as long as ￿ > 0. The results in
Proposition 3 are consistent with Theorem 3 in Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002). The case
14with positive ￿ corresponds to their case (ii), while their case (i) corresponds to our case
with negative ￿:
The current results for the single unit auction generalize naturally to the case of multi-
unit auctions with the associated generalized VCG mechanism. The precise statements
and proofs for the multi-unit case are stated in the appendix of working paper version, see
Bergemann, Shi, and Valimaki (2007), of this paper.
Our analysis also applies to the following two-component speci￿cation that is extensively
studied in the literature (see Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) and Jackson (2003) among
others):
ui (￿) = ￿0 + ￿i;
where ￿0 and ￿i are independently distributed random variables, representing a public and
a private component to agent i; respectively. In this bivariate model, we may think about
two alternative models of information acquisition with identical qualitative conclusions. If
each bidder has to make separate decisions regarding information about the private and the
common component, then it is as if the bidder faces a pure private value model with respect
to the ￿rst decision and faces a pure common value model with respect to the second decision.
Our earlier results for the generalized VCG mechanism now apply componentwise, i.e. we
will observe e￿cient information acquisition with respect to the private type and excessive
information acquisition with respect to the common component. Alternatively, if the bidder
can only observe a signal about the joint realization of the private and common component,
say about the sum, ￿0 + ￿i, then the incentives are jointly determined by the private and
common components. As the private element leads to an e￿cient decision and the common
element to excessive information acquisition, the sum of these e￿ects leads again to excessive
information acquisition, just as predicted by our interdependent value model.
4 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
So far we restricted our attention to the analysis of pure strategy equilibria and we showed
that the pure strategy equilibrium is unique up to permutations of the ex ante identical
bidders. Similarly, a socially e￿cient decision is always a deterministic policy. The pure
strategy equilibrium is frequently an asymmetric equilibrium in that some bidders acquire
and some bidders do not acquire information even though the bidders are ex ante identical.
15It may be di￿cult to see how this type of coordination might be achieved in a one-shot game.
As a result, it is of interest to also analyze the symmetric mixed strategy equilibria of the
game.
The mixed strategy equilibrium leads almost by de￿nition to a socially ine￿cient in-
formation policy since the agents frequently fail to coordinate their decision. In order to
facilitate a comparison with a socially optimal solution, we consider the problem of a plan-
ner who is restricted to choose an anonymous and hence symmetric information policy across
all agents. Under this restricted e￿ciency criterion we conclude, as in our earlier analysis,
that the equilibrium level of information acquisition will be higher than the socially e￿cient
level.
In the current model, the cost of information acquisition is known and identical to all
the bidders. It is natural to extend the model to allow for di￿erential costs of information
acquisition. If the cost of information acquisition were private information, then we can
think of the mixed strategy equilibrium here as the limit equilibrium of a model with pri-
vate information about the cost of information acquisition. By a standard argument ￿rst
suggested by Harsanyi (1973), the mixed strategy equilibrium here can then be puri￿ed by
a model with private information about the cost of information.
We restrict our analysis here to the case of moderate information cost so that the bidders
acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. The case of very low and
very high information costs would of course lead to degenerate mixed strategies and the only
complication would come from the quali￿cation to weak inequalities rather than equalities
in the equilibrium conditions. We denote by ￿￿ 2 (0;1) the socially optimal probability
of acquiring information, and by b ￿ 2 (0;1) the equilibrium probability of acquiring infor-
mation. With slight abuse of notation, we de￿ne the expected gain from information for a














We recall that ￿￿
m is the expected social gain from an additional informed bidder when
(m ￿ 1) bidders have already acquired information. The expected gain ￿￿ (￿) represents
the expected social gain from information when the planner is required to choose a single









m￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
I￿m b ￿m;
where b ￿m is the individual gain for bidder m to acquire information when (m ￿ 1) bidders
are already informed.
In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, individual bidders must be indi￿erent be-
tween acquiring information and staying uninformed. The expected relative gain from ac-
quiring information must be equal to the cost of information. Thus, the equilibrium policy
b ￿ must satisfy the following condition:
b ￿(b ￿) ￿ c = 0: (11)
Similarly, for the socially e￿cient policy ￿￿, the expected social gain from information must
be equal to the information cost:
￿
￿ (￿
￿) ￿ c = 0: (12)
Proposition 4 (Strategic Substitutes)
The gains from information, b ￿(￿) and ￿￿ (￿), are strictly decreasing in ￿.
The private and the social gain of a bidder from information acquisition are thus decreas-
ing as the probability of other buyers’ being informed increases. That is, the decisions to
acquire information remain strategic substitutes when we allow for probabilistic policies. It
also ensures that there are unique probabilities ￿￿ and b ￿ that satisfy equilibrium conditions
(11) and (12), respectively.
Proposition 5 (Excessive Information Acquisition)
For all ￿￿ 2 (0;1), ￿￿ < b ￿:
Thus the bidders have a higher probability of acquiring information in equilibrium than
in the social optimum. Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 extend the previous results in the
pure strategy analysis to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
175 Nonlinear Interdependence
We now investigate to what extent the results obtained in the linear payo￿ model general-
izes to nonlinear environments.6 We introduce a new condition, referred to as no-crossing
property, which guarantees that the ranking of any two bidders is una￿ected by the payo￿






We maintain a symmetric framework across agents. Speci￿cally we require that for all i and
j and all payo￿ type pro￿les ￿ and ￿
0, if ￿
0 is a permutation of ￿ and ￿i = ￿
0
j; then
ui (￿) = uj (￿
0):
We also maintain the single crossing condition in order to guarantee the truthful implemen-
tation of the e￿cient allocation by means of the generalized VCG mechanism:
￿i ￿ ￿j , ui (￿) ￿ uj (￿): (13)
Finally, the positive interdependence in the nonlinear setting simply requires that
@ui (￿)
@￿j
> 0, 8i;j; 8￿.
Clearly, the earlier linear payo￿ model belongs to the environment considered here. The
symmetry assumption is restrictive but natural. The single-crossing property is necessary to
implement the e￿cient allocation. The positive dependence is necessary to guarantee that
the individual returns from information exceed the social returns from information. Within
this setting, we introduce the no crossing property.7 Without loss of generality, we label the
set of informed bidders by f1;:::;mg.
Assumption 1 (No-Crossing Property)
The valuations fui (￿)g
I
i=1 satisfy the no-crossing property if for all m and all i;j 6= m :
9￿m s.t. E[ui (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m] > E[uj (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m] ) 8￿m; E[ui (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m] > E[uj (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m]:
6We would like to thank our discussant, Tim van Zandt, who asked us to further develop the nonlinear
environment and who suggested the no crossing condition.
7A slightly stronger version of this condition is imposed in Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002) to establish
their Theorem 3.
18It is easy to verify that the earlier linear payo￿ model satis￿es the no-crossing property.
The no-crossing property requires that the ranking of the expected payo￿ of two alternatives,
i versus j; is constant across all payo￿ types ￿m of agent m. If all agents are informed about
their payo￿ types and m = I, then the no-crossing property is automatically satis￿ed by the
single crossing condition (13), which simply states that the binary ranking of the alternatives
i and j is determined exclusively by their respective payo￿ types ￿i and ￿j. The no-crossing
property condition extends the uniformity of the binary ranking to the comparison of two
bidders i and j, where i is informed about her payo￿ type and j is not informed about her
payo￿ type. If the no-crossing property is violated, then the information of agent m may be
socially valuable in determining the allocation between i and j without agent m ever getting
the object. But if agent m does not receive the object, then she will have very weak private
incentives to acquire information even though it would be socially valuable. In consequence,
the ranking between the social incentive and the private incentive to acquire information
may be reversed.
An example of a valuation function with the no-crossing property is given by:




where ￿ is an increasing function. It is further apparent that the no-crossing condition is
valid for any multiplicative or additive separable speci￿cations of the valuation functions.
The no-crossing condition has an important implication.
Lemma 1
If the no-crossing property is satis￿ed, then for all m and all i;j 6= m; if
E[ui (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m￿1] > E[uj (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m￿1];
then
E[ui (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m] > E[uj (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m].
In words, the ranking between bidder i and j after bidder m gets informed is the same
as the ranking between them before bidder m becomes informed. The de￿nitions of the
marginal gains from information, given by b ￿m and ￿￿
m; extend in the natural way to the
nonlinear environment. The next proposition shows that the private gain from acquiring
information will be higher than the social gain from information.
19Proposition 6 (Excessive Incentives)
If the no-crossing property is satis￿ed, then b ￿m > ￿￿
m for all m:
Next we need to demonstrate that the private decisions of the bidders to acquire infor-
mation will remain strategic substitutes in the nonlinear environment, provided that the
no-crossing property is satis￿ed.
Proposition 7 (Strategic Substitutes)
If the no-crossing property is satis￿ed, then b ￿m < b ￿m￿1 for all m < I:
The current result is stated and proved only for m < I. While we suspect that it extends
to the ￿nal bidder, we have not been able to prove this result in the nonlinear setting. We
should point out, that as long as the number of potential bidders is large (for example, if
entry is close to free), and the cost of acquiring information is not negligible, then the issue
of m = I will be irrelevant in equilibrium as in equilibrium there will always be informed and
uninformed bidders as m ￿ I. Proposition 6 and 7 can still enable us to get the uniqueness
of the equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium information acquisition will be excessive in
comparison to the social optimum.
The no-crossing property imposes a substantial restriction on the form of the payo￿
functions. If the payo￿ functions are neither additively nor multiplicatively separable, then
the no-crossing property might be violated. This is easily shown with the following example
of three bidders, i 2 f1;2;3g. The valuation of bidder i is given by:
ui (￿) = (1 + ￿i)
2 + (￿j + ￿k)￿j￿k. (14)
The payo￿ types ￿i are assumed to be independently drawn from the uniform distribution
on the unit interval. Clearly, the model is symmetric, satis￿es the single-crossing property
and displays positive interdependence. Within the example given by (14) it is now easy to
show that the ranking of an informed agent, say 1 and an uniformed agent, say 3, is a￿ected
by the payo￿ type of agent 2. We omit the calculations.
206 Discussion
The analysis of the auction environment began with positive interdependence of the payo￿
types. We established that the private and the social decisions to acquire information are
strategic substitutes and that the private returns from information exceed the social returns
from information. Consequently, it might be plausible to deduce that the driving force behind
the results is the positive interdependence of the payo￿ types. In this section, we show that
positive interdependence is not su￿cient to make information acquisition decisions strategic
substitutes. In order to obtain the result on excessive information acquisition, a separate
argument for the strategic substitute property is needed.
So far, our analysis considered only the case of positive interdependence. We now show
how the analysis naturally extends to a setting with negative interdependence. With negative
interdependence, the bidders’ decisions to acquire information remain strategic substitutes,
but the comparison between private and social gains from information is reversed and con-
sequently the equilibrium information acquisition is socially insu￿cient.
6.1 Strategic Complements
With positive interdependence, Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002) show that the individual
bidders will have socially excessive incentives to acquire information given the information
decision of the remaining agents. The results in Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002) are thus
about a local property of the decision of agent i in the sense that the decision of the remaining
agents are kept constant. In particular, the characterization of the individual decision may
not transfer to the equilibrium decisions of the agents. We now provide an example of positive
interdependence with the property that the decisions to acquire information are strategic
complements rather than strategic substitutes. Despite the positive interdependence, an
equilibrium of the game will display a lower level of information acquisition than the social
equilibrium.
Suppose there are two bidders, i 2 f1;2g, competing for a single object. The payo￿
structure is the linear payo￿ structure of the previous sections:
ui (￿i;￿j) = ￿i + ￿￿j;
but we now allow for negative payo￿ types. The social planner can either allocate the object
21to bidder 1 or 2 or decide not to allocate the object at all. In particular it is e￿cient not to
assign the object if the expected valuation of both bidders is below zero.
For concreteness, we consider ￿ = 0:5 and assume that the payo￿ types ￿i are indepen-
dently drawn from the uniform distribution with the support given by [￿5;1]. It is now easy
to verify that the decisions to acquire information are strategic complements. If bidder j
stays uninformed, then it is e￿cient not to assign the object to bidder i for any realization
of her payo￿ type. In consequence, the value of information for agent i is zero if agent j
does not acquire information. On the other hand, if agent j does acquire information, then
a positive realization by both agents may lead to the assignment of the object to agent i and
hence there is positive value of information.8
Therefore, consistent with the analysis of Bergemann and V￿ alim￿ aki (2002), the private
gain is weakly higher than the social gain from information. But the analysis of the indi-
vidual decision of agent i does not necessarily translate into a corresponding equilibrium
characterization. For example, we can show by elementary computations that if the cost of
information is c = 1=100; then the e￿cient policy requires that both bidders acquire infor-
mation. However, due to the strategic complementarity, there are now two pure strategy
equilibria for the game of information acquisition: one in which both bidders remain unin-
formed, the other one in which both bidders become informed. It is therefore possible that
the two bidders fail to coordinate on the e￿cient equilibrium and stay uninformed. The key
for the failure of the equilibrium characterization is that the private gain from information
is increasing in the number of informed bidders, that is, information decisions are strategic
complements.
6.2 Negative Interdependence
Until now, our analysis assumed that the bidders’ valuations are positively dependent. We
now adapt the argument to the case with negative interdependence. For example, consider
8We note that the negative payo￿ types are not necessary to generate the strategic complementarity in
the information decision among the agents. A similar result could be generated in an asymmetric three
bidder model with positive types. If we were to introduce a third bidder with a strictly positive valuation,
then exactly the same argument would go through.
22the linear model in Section 2:




but with ￿ < 0: Analogous to our previous analysis, one can show that
￿
￿
m = (1 ￿ ￿) b ￿m; for m = 1;:::;I:
Therefore, given ￿ < 0; the social gain from information acquisition is now higher than the
private gain from information. Furthermore, we can verify that both ￿￿
m and b ￿m remain
strictly decreasing in m. In other words, the individual decisions to acquire information
remain strategic substitutes in both the socially e￿cient policy and the equilibrium policy.
Hence, the equilibrium information acquisition is now socially insu￿cient. Similarly, the
analysis for the nonlinear model in Section 5 is extended to the case of negative interdepen-
dence by reversing the relevant inequalities.
7 Conclusion
In a model with interdependent valuations, the equilibrium level of information acquisition
di￿ers from the socially e￿cient level. This paper shows that in many speci￿cations of
the model, information acquisition is excessive in equilibrium. This opens up a number of
new questions. How could a planner correct the incentives? If information acquisition is
covert, it is not easy for the planner to change the cost of information as the uninformed
bidders can always pretend to be the informed bidders. While participation fees reduce the
bidders’ expected payo￿s, they do at the same time discourage uninformed bidders from
participating. This may result in suboptimal allocations. Another possibility to correct the
private incentives could be to assign the object at random between the highest bidders if the
bids (and hence the valuations) are relatively close. The welfare losses from such a distorted
allocation would be small since it would only happens if the valuations do not di￿er by much.
On the other hand, the payments of all winning bids are increased and hence the expected
payo￿s decrease as a result of such a policy.
The current paper primarily considers ex post e￿cient mechanisms. Since there are close
connections between e￿cient mechanisms and optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanisms,
some of the results here have direct implications for revenue maximizing mechanisms as
23well. Consider ￿rst the case when the seller controls the access to information and hence the
relevant participation constraints for the bidders are the ex ante participation constraints.
Then we can use the insights of Levin and Smith (1994) to show that the revenue maximizing
mechanism in certain auction environment with endogenous entry also leads to an ex post
e￿cient allocation. In particular, with positive interdependence, an appropriately chosen
entry fee may correct private incentives and help induce the socially optimal number of
bidders in equilibrium.9
However, our model of covert information acquisition is more in line with a model where
the seller does not control the access to the information source and information decisions
are decentralized. In such models, the participation constraint is e￿ective at the interim
stage. In this environment, it may not be feasible to charge an entry fee and the seller may
have to use reserve prices to align incentives. In general, the optimal mechanism will no
longer coincide with the e￿cient mechanism. In particular, we expect that the informational
e￿ciency in auctions will depend critically on the underlying distribution of valuations as
shown by Shi (2007) in a private value environment.
Finally, in our model, the supply side of the model is ￿xed. It would be interesting
to study information acquisition in large double auctions where the equilibrium price is
determined by competing buyers and sellers.
9If bidders make information decisions sequentially, Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2003) show that a
sequential mechanism can extract full surplus and induce e￿cient level of information acquisition.
248 Appendix
The appendix contains the proofs of all the results presented in the main body of the paper.
We ￿rst state and establish a lemma that will be used in proving both Proposition 1 and 2.
Speci￿cally, we will use the ￿rst part of the lemma to show the monotonicity of the gains
from information in the number of informed bidders for m < I; and use the second part of
the lemma to extend the monotonicity to the last bidder with m = I:
Lemma 2
1. For all m;
E￿m;ym [(￿m ￿ ym) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ym)]
is strictly decreasing in m.
2. For all m;
E￿m;￿h [(￿h ￿ ￿m) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿m) ￿ (￿m ￿ ￿) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ￿ > ￿h)] < 0:
Proof of Lemma 2. We denote by Gm and gm the cumulative distribution and density of
￿h, respectively. Since bidder h has the highest signal among (m ￿ 1) informed bidders, we
have the usual order statistics with
Gm (￿h) = F
m￿1 (￿h)
and
gm (￿h) = (m ￿ 1)F
m￿2 (￿h)f (￿h):
For part 1, we observe that





































The ￿rst equality follows by the de￿nition of ym; and the second equality is a result of integra-
tion by parts. It is easy to see from the last expression that E￿m;ym [(￿m ￿ ym) ￿ 1(￿m ￿ ym)]
is strictly decreasing in m:
25For part 2, we note that
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Thus, the proof is complete.￿
Proof of Proposition 1. From the social point of view, bidder m should acquire informa-
tion if and only if the social expected gain ￿￿















2 > ￿￿￿ > ￿￿






I = (1 ￿ ￿)E￿I;￿h [(￿I ￿ ￿h) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + (￿h ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I)]
= (1 ￿ ￿)E￿I;yI [(￿I ￿ yI) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ yI)]
+(1 ￿ ￿)E￿I;￿h [(￿h ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I) ￿ (￿I ￿ ￿) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿ > ￿h)]
< (1 ￿ ￿)E￿I;yI [(￿I ￿ yI) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ yI)]




The ￿rst inequality follows from part 2 of Lemma 2 and the second inequality follows by
part 1of Lemma 2. The fact that ￿￿
m is strictly decreasing in ￿ follows from expression (6)
and (8).￿
Proof of Proposition 2. From bidder m’s point of view, the optimal information decision





0 if b ￿m < c
1 if b ￿m ￿ c
:
26The fact that b ￿1 > b ￿2 > ￿￿￿ > b ￿I￿1 follows from part 1 of Lemma 2. Notice that
b ￿I = E￿I;￿h [(￿I ￿ ￿h) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿) + (￿h ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I)]
= E￿I;yI [(￿I ￿ yI) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ yI)]
+ E￿I;￿h [(￿h ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1(￿ > ￿h > ￿I) ￿ (￿I ￿ ￿) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ ￿ > ￿h)]
< E￿I;yI [(￿I ￿ yI) ￿ 1(￿I ￿ yI)]
< E￿I￿1;yI￿1 [(￿I￿1 ￿ yI￿1) ￿ 1(￿I￿1 ￿ yI￿1)]
= b ￿I￿1:
The ￿rst inequality follows from part 2 of Lemma 2 and the second inequality follows by
part 1of Lemma 2. From expression (9) and (10), it is easy to see b ￿m is constant in ￿:￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Comparing expression (6) and (8) with (9) and (10), we have
￿
￿
m = (1 ￿ ￿) b ￿m; for all m: (15)
Since 0 < ￿ ￿ 1; ￿￿
m < b ￿m: This result, together with the fact that both sequences f￿￿
mg
and fb ￿mg are strictly decreasing, implies that in equilibrium, (weakly) more bidders are
informed in equilibrium than in the socially optimal solution.
>From (15), we obtain
b ￿m ￿ ￿
￿
m = ￿b ￿m:
By Proposition 2, b ￿m is constant in ￿ and decreasing in m. Therefore, b ￿m ￿ ￿￿
m is strictly
increasing in ￿ and strictly decreasing in m:￿









m￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
I￿m b ￿m:
Notice that if ￿1 > ￿2 then a binomial distribution generated by the probability of success
￿1 ￿rst-order stochastically dominates a binomial distribution generated by ￿2 (see Example
6.A.2 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994), p.172-173). This fact, together with the mono-
tonicity of b ￿m, implies that b ￿(￿) is decreasing in ￿: The monotonicity of ￿￿ (￿) in ￿ can
be proved analogously.￿























m￿1 (1 ￿ b ￿)
I￿m b ￿m:
Since b ￿m > ￿￿









m￿1 (1 ￿ ￿
￿)








m￿1 (1 ￿ b ￿)
I￿m b ￿m:
Then ￿￿ < b ￿ can be deduced by applying Proposition 4.￿
Proof of Lemma 1. The assumption E[ui (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m￿1] > E[uk (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m￿1] implies









But by the no-crossing property, we must have
E[ui (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m￿1;￿m] > E[uk (￿)j￿1;:::;￿m￿1;￿m] for all ￿m;
which completes the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. To simplify notation, let J denote the set of informed bidders
f1;:::;m ￿ 1g and ￿J denote the vector f￿jgj2J. We need to show that, for any bidder m = 2 J;
her private gain is lower than the social gain from information about ￿m: Conditional on the
realization of ￿J; there are two possible scenarios. First, conditional on ￿J; the social planner
awards the item to i 6= m: Second, conditional on ￿J; the social planner awards the item to
m and bidder i is the runner-up. Let zm be the value at which
E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m = zm] = E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m = zm]:
That is, zm is the cuto￿ type such that bidder m will overtake bidder i if bidder m has a
type realization higher than zm. By Lemma 1, we need to focus on bidder i and m only.
Case 1: Conditional on ￿J; the social planner awards the item to i 6= m. If ￿m ￿ zm,
bidder i will retain the object, and both the private value and the social value of information
28about ￿m is equal to zero. If ￿m > zm; then bidder m wins the object and her VCG payment
is E[ui (￿)j￿J;zm]: Therefore, the private gain from information for bidder m is
E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m] ￿ E[ui (￿)j￿J;zm];
which is larger than the social gain from information
E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m] ￿ E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m];
because
E[ui (￿)j￿J;zm] < E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m]
by the assumption of positive dependence.
Case 2: Conditional on ￿J; the social planner awards the item to m. Let bidder i be the
second highest bidder when bidder m is informed. If ￿m ￿ zm, bidder m retains the object
and both the private value and the social value of information are equal to zero. If ￿m < zm,
bidder i wins the object. The gain to bidder m is then the foregone loss from paying more
than the true value of the object to m. Her private gain is given by
E[ui (￿)j￿J;zm] ￿ E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m];
which is higher than the social value of information:
E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m] ￿ E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m];
since by Assumption 2:
E[ui (￿)j￿J;zm] > E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m]:
Thus, in both cases, the private gain from information is higher than the social gain from
information. Therefore, b ￿m < ￿￿
m for all m. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Again let J denote the set of informed bidders f1;:::;m ￿ 1g and
￿J denote the vector f￿jgj2J . Fix J such that I￿#fjjj 2 Jg ￿ 2; that is, there are at least
two uninformed bidders. We need to show that a bidder i’s private gain from information
when bidder m = 2 J is uninformed is lower than her private gain when bidder m becomes
informed. Conditional on ￿J only, there are ￿ve possible cases:
Case 1: The social planner awards the object to k 6= fi;mg:
Case 2: The social planner awards the object to m; and the second highest bidder is k 6= i:
29Case 3: The social planner awards the object to m; and the second highest bidder is i:
Case 4: The social planner awards the object to i; and the second highest bidder is k 6= m:
Case 5: The social planner awards the object to i; and the second highest bidder is m:
Given the result of Lemma 1, it is easy to see that for Case 1 and Case 2 bidder m’s
information decision has no e￿ect on bidder i’s expected gain from information. So we only
need to analyze the remaining three cases.
For Case 3, bidder m wins and the runner up is i: Since there are at least two uninformed
bidders (including m), there must be another uninformed bidder tied with m: So bidder i’s
payo￿ will be zero regardless of bidder m’s information decision.
For Case 4, bidder i must be an informed bidder. Let ￿Jni denote the vector of signals of
all bidders in J other than i; and let zi solve
E
￿




uk (￿)j￿Jni;￿i = zi
￿
That is, zi is the critical type at which bidder i has a weakly higher valuation than bidder










In order to compare bidder i’s private gains with and without bidder m’s information, it
is convenient to introduce an auxiliary benchmark. We will show that bidder i’s expected
payo￿ without bidder m’s information is the same as her payo￿ in the auxiliary benchmark.
Suppose the social planner has access to bidder m’s private information, but only treats it
as an exogenous signal. In particular, bidder m cannot be the winner or the runner up based
on her information. Then by Lemma 1, bidder i will still win the object and the runner up
is still bidder k. However, i’s payment will depend on the realization of ￿m. Let b zi solve
E
￿




uk (￿)j￿Jni;￿i = b zi;￿m
￿
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Therefore, b zi = zi. Then it follows from the law of iterated expectation that bidder i’s
expected payo￿ with bidder m uninformed is the same as her expected payo￿ in the auxiliary
benchmark.
Once we have established the payo￿ equivalence between the equilibrium payo￿ and the
payo￿ in the auxiliary benchmark given an uninformed bidder m, it only remains to consider
the case with an informed bidder m. If
E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m] > E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m];
then bidder m wins the object, so the private gain for bidder i is equal to zero. Compared
to the auxiliary benchmark, bidder i is worse o￿. If
E[ui (￿)j￿J;￿m] > E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m] > E[uk (￿)j￿J;￿m];
then bidder m becomes the second highest bidder, and bidder i’s payment will be based
on bidder m’s valuations. Thus bidder i pays more and consequently her payo￿ decreases.
Finally, if
E[um (￿)j￿J;￿m] < E[uk (￿)j￿J;￿m];
then bidder i wins and the runner up is still bidder k; so bidder i’s payo￿ remains unchanged.
In summary, bidder i’s expected gain from information is lower when bidder m gets informed.
Finally, in Case 5, bidder i wins and the runner up is bidder m: Again since there are
at least two uninformed bidders, there must be another uninformed bidder j 6= m: We can
rede￿ne the runner up as bidder j; and then we return to Case 4.
Therefore, in all ￿ve cases, when bidder m gets informed, bidder i’s expected gain from
information either stays the same or decreases and the proof is complete.￿
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